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Plaintiffs, who are video creators seeking monetary and other recovery based on the 
alleged editorial decisions of a popular Internet platform, YouTube, have raised a 
constitutional challenge to Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
(“CDA”) (Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)).  When the World Wide 
Web was in its early days in 1996, Congress sought through Section 230(c) to promote and 
protect “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material by limiting the 
liability of website owners and operators.  The statute immunizes for certain liability purposes 
an “interactive computer service” provider from being treated as the publisher or speaker of 
content created by third parties and hosted by the service (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)), or for 
removing or restricting access to certain types of offensive material (§ 230(c)(2)).   
In seeking Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the operative complaint, YouTube has invoked 
the statute as an affirmative defense to Plaintiffs’ claims, and Plaintiffs have responded by 
arguing, among other things, that the statute violates the First Amendment and the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the extent it shields YouTube from liability 
for Plaintiffs’ claims.  Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgement to that effect.   
The United States intervenes today in response to Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge, 
and, in defense of the statute, respectfully limits this brief to two arguments. 
First, under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, this Court should start by 
deciding the statutory arguments presented by the parties regarding the pending Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, because those non-constitutional grounds may obviate the need for decision on any 
constitutional question.  A court should decide a constitutional question only when 
necessary, which would not be the situation here if the Court were to conclude that statutory 
grounds suffice to dispose of the case.   
Second, if the Court concludes that it must reach the constitutional question, Plaintiffs’ 
challenge should be rejected on the merits.  Section 230(c) does not regulate Plaintiffs’ 
primary conduct.  Instead, the statute establishes a rule prohibiting liability for certain 
conduct by online platforms, including YouTube.  Because the United States is intervening 
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for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of Section 230(c), it does not take 
a position on whether the statute forecloses the particular claims Plaintiffs have alleged.  But 
assuming it does, that would not violate the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, because—as 
the Ninth Circuit squarely held in Prager University v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 
2020)—YouTube is not a state actor capable of denying the freedom of speech.  In other 
words, Section 230(c) would not deny Plaintiffs any constitutional claim they otherwise 
would have.  Nor do Plaintiffs’ arguments find support in the First Amendment’s Petition 
Clause or in the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.  In short, however Plaintiffs’ 
challenge to Section 230(c) is framed, it is meritless, and should be rejected. 
STATEMENT 
I. Statutory Background 
Section 230(c) of the CDA is entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material.”  The Ninth Circuit has described the statute as 
“immuniz[ing] providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from 
content created by third parties.”  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (footnotes omitted).  
In particular, Paragraph (1) states:  “No provider . . . of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The statute also provides that “[n]o 
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law 
that is inconsistent with this section.”  Id. § 230(e)(3).  The result is to protect online 
platforms from such liabilities as those the common law imposed on publishers or speakers 
for libel or slander.  Some courts have also construed the limitation to shield online platforms 
against certain liabilities under federal law.  See, e.g., Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 
144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 
697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir. 2017).  The immunity applies only when the interactive computer 
service provider is not also the “information content provider” of the material in question—
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i.e., the person “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of” the 
“offending content.”  See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162-63 (quoting § 230(f)(3)).   
For its part, Paragraph (2) describes a separate immunity.  It states: 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account 
of — 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; 
or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information 
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
material described in paragraph [A].  
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).* 
The problem Congress sought to solve in Section 230(c) arose from a New York state 
trial court’s ruling that an internet service provider that had voluntarily deleted some 
messages from an online message board was then “legally responsible for the content of 
defamatory messages that it failed to delete.”  See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163 (discussing 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 
24, 1995)).  The statute responded by “immuniz[ing] the removal of user-generated content, 
not the creation of content.”  Id.  That is, Section 230 “provides ‘Good Samaritan’ protections 
from civil liability for providers . . . of an interactive computer service for actions to restrict 
. . . access to objectionable online material.  One of the specific purposes of this section is to 
overrule Stratton . . . which . . . treated such providers . . . as publishers or speakers of content 
that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10. 
                                                 
* The text of Paragraph (2)(B) refers to “the material described in paragraph (1),” but 
the Ninth Circuit “take[s] it that the reference to the ‘material described in paragraph (1)’ is 
a typographical error, and that instead the reference should be to . . . § 230(c)(2)(A),” 
because “Paragraph (1) pertains to the treatment of a publisher or speaker and has nothing 
to do with ‘material,’ whereas subparagraph (A) pertains to and describes material.”  Zango, 
Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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According to the Ninth Circuit, Section 230(c)(1) shields the defendant from a claim 
wherever “the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the 
defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’”  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).  In that context, the Ninth Circuit views “publication” as 
“involv[ing] reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from 
publication third-party content.”  Id..  The Ninth Circuit has remarked in an en banc opinion 
that “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third 
parties seek to post online is perforce immune” under Section 230(c)(1).  Roommates, 521 F.3d 
at 1170-71. 
The Ninth Circuit has described one of the policies behind the liability shield as 
promotion of speech—that is, to “avoid the chilling effect upon Internet free speech that 
would be occasioned by the imposition of tort liability upon companies that do not create 
potentially harmful messages but are simply intermediaries for their delivery.”  Doe v. Internet 
Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 
Cal. App. 4th 790, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).  In enacting Section 230(c), 
Congress made findings describing online platforms as offering “a forum for a true diversity 
of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity.”  § 230(a)(3).  Accordingly, “the policy of the United States” is “to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  § 230(b)(2) 
(emphasis added).  To be sure, Congress also determined that it was the policy of the United 
States “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking 
in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”  § 230(b)(5) (emphasis added).  
But in balancing the various interests, Congress sought “not to deter harmful online speech 
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries 
for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.”  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-
31 (4th Cir. 1997) (Wilkinson, C.J.) (emphasis added).   
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II. Proceedings In Plaintiffs’ Case 
The instant Plaintiffs are “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Transsexual or Queer 
internet content creators” who make videos, including many that “discuss issues which affect 
members of the LGBTQ+ community.”  2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 41 (Doc. 20) (“SAC”).  
YouTube, owned by Google, is allegedly the dominant Internet video platform, hosting 
“roughly 95%” of global “public video-based content,” and “monetizing the free speech and 
expression of . . . the 2.3 billion people who now use” it.  SAC ¶ 15.  Plaintiffs allegedly 
contracted with YouTube, licensing it to distribute their videos while agreeing that YouTube 
retained various rights—including the right to enforce its community guidelines, and the 
right to determine “in its sole discretion” whether the videos contained “material . . . in 
violation of” the agreement.  Rule 12(b)(6) Opp. 4 (Doc. 28); see SAC ¶¶ 10, 117(d), 288.  
According to Plaintiffs, YouTube “monetize[s]” the videos by selling advertisements for 
display along with them, and some Plaintiffs have paid YouTube to promote their videos 
(individually or grouped into channels) to potential viewers.  SAC ¶¶ 55, 89, 131.  YouTube 
allegedly retains “unfettered and absolute discretion to restrict the viewership, reach, and 
monetization of [the] videos.”  SAC ¶ 118. 
One way that YouTube allegedly exercises that discretion is through its “Restricted 
Mode,” which works “much like a curtain” to “block[] access” by “younger, sensitive 
audiences to video content that contains certain specifically enumerated ‘mature’ aspects.”  
SAC ¶ 77.  When a viewer turns on “Restricted Mode” for a personal account (or when it is 
activated by a parent or system administrator, such as one acting on behalf of a public library, 
school, or other work place) and lands on a video placed in “Restricted Mode,” instead of 
showing the video, YouTube displays a warning, stating that the video is unavailable and that 
to view the video the viewer would “need to disable Restricted Mode.”  SAC ¶¶ 77-79, 83, 
343.  YouTube allegedly tells viewers who inquire that videos are placed in “Restricted Mode” 
when they include, among other things, “[o]verly detailed conversations about or depictions 
of sex or sexual activity,” “inappropriate language, including profanity,” or other sensitive 
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content.  SAC ¶¶ 26, 85, 344, 345, 346.  “On average, 1.5–2% of users view YouTube 
through Restricted Mode.”  Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 996. 
YouTube has allegedly styled itself (including in testimony to Congress) as a “neutral 
public forum.”  SAC ¶¶ 61, 287, 342.  But Plaintiffs allege that YouTube has used its “power 
over filtering” as a “censorship power to silence and crush Plaintiffs because they identify 
[as] LGBTQ+ and express LGBTQ+ viewpoints.”  SAC ¶ 21.  In particular, Plaintiffs allege 
that YouTube placed some of their videos into “Restricted Mode,” or rendered certain videos 
ineligible for generation of advertising revenue by “demonetizing” them, justified by 
YouTube’s alleged false statements that the videos contained “inappropriate” or “otherwise 
objectionable” content.  SAC ¶¶ 3, 26, 151, 345-47.  According to Plaintiffs, the episodes of 
“Restricted Mode” and demonetization misuse they allege are not isolated; rather, YouTube 
purportedly has a “‘company policy’ of not selling ads to ‘gay’ content creators because the 
‘gay thing’ render[s] [their] video[s] ‘shocking’ and sexually explicit regardless of the actual 
content of the video[s].”  SAC ¶ 20; see SAC ¶¶ 122, 134, 146; SAC Ex. A (transcript of 
communication with Google Support staff in Bangalore, India allegedly describing policy).   
Plaintiffs seek a declaration that 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) violates the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments; they allege that applying the statute as a bar on their claims would be “both 
an unconstitutional restraint on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to freedom of petition 
and speech, and a violation of equal protection of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
SAC ¶ 261; see SAC ¶¶ 280-82.  Plaintiffs also assert various claims against YouTube, 
including two federal statutory claims—one alleging that YouTube engaged in 
unconstitutional “[v]iewpoint-[b]ased [d]iscrimination” remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(SAC ¶¶ 283-303), and the other alleging that YouTube engaged in false advertising and false 
association in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 et seq. (SAC ¶¶ 337-48). 
This Court has not yet certified any constitutional question under 28 U.S.C. § 2403 
and Rule 5.1.  On March 9, 2020, this Court endorsed a stipulation providing the United 
States until April 24, 2020 to determine whether to intervene and to file a brief, if any.  Doc. 
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32.  On the Government’s motion, the Court later enlarged the time for the United States to 
intervene to May 8, 2020.  Doc. 44. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court Should First Decide The Potentially Dispositive Statutory Issues 
Because They May Obviate The Need To Address Plaintiffs’ 
Constitutional Challenge 
As an initial matter, this Court should not address the constitutionality of Section 
230(c) unless it first determines that the pending motion to dismiss cannot be resolved on 
non-constitutional grounds.  “If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in 
the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of 
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”  Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House 
of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999) (quoting Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 
101, 105 (1944)); see id., 525 U.S. at 344 (“[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, 
one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or 
general law, the Court will decide only the latter”) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 
347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
This Court should adhere to that doctrine of constitutional avoidance here and 
decline to rule on the constitutionality of Section 230(c) unless the motion to dismiss cannot 
be resolved on other grounds.  The United States has intervened solely for the purpose of 
defending the constitutionality of Section 230(c) and therefore takes no position on the 
merits of the non-constitutional issues.  It is apparent, however, that the Court’s resolution 
of those issues might obviate the need to consider Section 230(c)’s constitutionality.   
Here is one example:  Plaintiffs assert a Section 1983 claim (SAC ¶¶ 283-303), and 
Lanham Act claims for false advertising and false association (SAC ¶¶ 337-48).  This Court 
might decide that Plaintiffs have not alleged the elements of either of those federal statutory 
claims in light of the Ninth Circuit’s twin conclusions in Prager University that (1) YouTube is 
not a state actor constrained by the First Amendment (951 F.3d at 999), and (2) “YouTube’s 
statements concerning its content moderation policies do not constitute ‘commercial 
advertising or promotion’” within the meaning of the Lanham Act  (id. at 999-1000 (quoting 
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15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B))).  And this Court might similarly decide that Plaintiffs have not 
alleged the elements of their state law claims. 
Here is another example:  Plaintiffs contend that Section 230(c) does not apply to the 
misconduct alleged.  Rule 12(b)(6) Opp. 13-21.  If the Court were to conclude that 
YouTube’s acts as alleged by Plaintiffs do not fit within the terms of either paragraph 
230(c)(1) or (2), then the statute would not apply, and there would be no occasion for passing 
on the constitutionality of the statute. 
In short, where “dispositive” statutory grounds may be available, it is “incumbent on” 
this Court to examine and decide the case on those grounds first.  Cf. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. 
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582 (1979) (“Before deciding the constitutional question, it was 
incumbent on [lower courts] to consider whether the statutory grounds might be 
dispositive.”).  
II. If The Court Reaches the Question, It Should Conclude That 
Section 230(c) Is Constitutional 
If the Court were to reach the constitutional question, it should conclude that 
Plaintiffs’ challenge fails on the merits.  Section 230(c) does not regulate or limit Plaintiffs’ 
primary conduct, such as their expressive activities.  For example, Plaintiffs do not allege that 
Section 230(c) prevents them from creating videos or posting them on the Internet.  Cf. 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (restriction on virtual child pornography 
challenged by creators of erotic and nudist works).  Instead, Section 230(c) establishes a 
substantive limitation on the liability of certain Internet companies for claims arising from 
certain specified conduct.  But Plaintiffs cannot show that Congress violated Plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights by making that affirmative defense available here to YouTube, because 
none of the clauses of the Constitution on which Plaintiffs rely confers on Plaintiffs any right 
to bring an underlying claim. 
First, Plaintiffs do not identify any valid underlying First Amendment speech claim 
they could have brought against YouTube had Section 230(c) not been in force.  To the 
contrary, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held in Prager University that “YouTube is a private 
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entity” that is not a state actor subject to the constraints of the First Amendment.  See 951 
F.3d at 996, 999.  The Ninth Circuit observed that “courts have uniformly concluded that 
digital internet platforms that open their property to user-generated content do not become 
state actors,” and held that “the state action doctrine precludes constitutional scrutiny of 
YouTube’s content moderation pursuant to its Terms of Service and Community 
Guidelines.”  See id. at 997, 999.  The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that “YouTube may be a 
paradigmatic public square on the Internet, but it is ‘not transformed’ into a state actor solely 
by ‘provid[ing] a forum for speech.’”  Id. at 997 (quoting Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. 
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930, 1934 (2019)). 
The Ninth Circuit relied on the “Supreme Court’s state action precedent,” including 
“its recent teaching in Halleck.”  Id.  In that 2019 decision, the Supreme Court explained:  
“[W]hen a private entity provides a forum for speech, the private entity is not ordinarily 
constrained by the First Amendment because the private entity is not a state actor.  The 
private entity may thus exercise editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in the 
forum.”  Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930.  As one illustration, the Court commented:  “Benjamin 
Franklin did not have to operate his newspaper as ‘a stagecoach, with seats for everyone.’”  
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1931 (quoting F. Mott, American Journalism 55 (3d ed. 1962)).  And the 
Supreme Court made clear that an “imprecise and overbroad phrase” in “passing dicta” in 
one of its prior decisions “should not be read to suggest that private property owners or 
private lessees are subject to First Amendment constraints whenever they dedicate their 
private property to public use or otherwise open their property for speech.”  See id. at 1931 
n.3 (discussing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)).  
No exception to that principle about private property owners applies to YouTube, as the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned.  See Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 997-99. 
Because YouTube is not a state actor, its alleged misconduct toward Plaintiffs does 
not implicate Plaintiffs’ freedom of speech.  And because YouTube’s actions do not implicate 
the First Amendment, the liability protection Section 230(c) affords to YouTube likewise 
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does not implicate the First Amendment.  Or, put another way, Section 230(c) has not 
deprived Plaintiffs of any valid underlying Speech Clause claim. 
Second, although Plaintiffs’ Petition Clause argument lacks detailed explanation, they 
appear to contend that the Petition Clause requires Congress to allow them to proceed with 
their federal and state law claims even though the challenged statute provides an affirmative 
defense potentially foreclosing those claims.  See SAC ¶ 281 (alleging that unconstitutionality 
stems from “Google/YouTube’s use of Section 230(c) as a shield to prevent Plaintiffs from 
petitioning the courts for relief to redress violations of their civil, consumer, and contractual rights, 
including rights which expressly protect Plaintiffs as a class from identity or viewpoint based 
discrimination and speech restrictions”) (emphasis added); see also Rule 12(b)(6) Opp. 20-21 
(contending that “the [Communications Decency Act] cannot be construed to preclude 
Plaintiffs from petitioning the Courts to redress discriminatory and unlawful restrictions their 
rights to free speech and equal benefits and protection of the law”) (emphasis added).  That 
assertion mistakenly posits that the Petition Clause requires the Government to guarantee 
Plaintiffs the ability to continue to litigate the particular claims for relief they have alleged 
and to reach a particular outcome (here, denial of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion).  Tellingly, 
Plaintiffs have cited no precedents construing the Petition Clause as guaranteeing such an 
outcome in litigation. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has observed that its “precedents confirm that the 
Petition Clause protects the right of individuals to appeal to courts and other forums 
established by the government for resolution of legal disputes.  ‘[T]he right of access to courts 
for redress of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government.’”  
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 
U.S. 883, 896-97 (1984)).  “A petition,” the Supreme Court has further explained, “conveys 
the special concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests action 
by the government to address those concerns.”  Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 388-89 (citing Sure-
Tan, 467 at 896-97).   
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But the requirements of the Petition Clause have already been fully satisfied in this 
case, given that, by commencing this action, Plaintiffs “convey[ed] [their] special concerns 
. . . to the government and . . . request[ed] action by the government to address those 
concerns.”  See Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 388-89.  And Plaintiffs remain free to urge Congress to 
amend the statute.  The Petition Clause, however, does not mandate the substantive response 
to their petition that Plaintiffs desire—i.e., a decision disregarding the affirmative defense set 
forth in Section 230(c).   
Were it otherwise, every statute or precedent limiting or preempting previously-
available legal remedies would violate the Petition Clause.  To the contrary:  As the Supreme 
Court explained in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
State (and, accordingly, the Federal Government) “remains free to create substantive 
defenses or immunities for use in adjudication—or to eliminate its statutorily created causes 
of action altogether . . . .”  Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1982). 
Plaintiffs’ Petition Clause argument resembles the Due Process Clause argument the 
Ninth Circuit rejected in Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009).  The plaintiffs there 
challenged a federal statute limiting the liability of firearms manufacturers in certain 
circumstances.  In upholding the law, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress’s “legislative 
determination” creating the liability protection “provides all the process that is due.”  Id. at 
1141-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court also rejected the contention that the 
statutory liability limitation deprived the plaintiffs of a property right, reasoning that “a 
party’s property right in any cause of action does not vest until a final unreviewable judgment 
is obtained.”  See id. at 1140-41 (quoting Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 F.3d 943, 956 (9th 
Cir. 2005)). 
Although Plaintiffs have not explicitly invoked the Due Process Clause as a basis for 
their challenge here, they advance an interpretation of the Petition Clause that would 
effectively circumvent Logan and Ileto.  At least where, as here, Plaintiffs did not obtain a 
“final unreviewable judgment” in their favor before Section 230(c) came into force, they have 
no entitlement to the particular legal theories they have alleged.  See Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1140-
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41.  Congress therefore retained authority to impose limitations on those theories by enacting 
Section 230(c).  Logan and Ileto thus provide additional confirmation that Plaintiffs’ Petition 
Clause theory lacks merit. 
Third, Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge fails for the same reasons as their First 
Amendment Speech and Petition claims, and does not require separate analysis under Ninth 
Circuit precedent.  “It is generally unnecessary to analyze laws which burden the exercise of 
First Amendment rights by a class of persons under the equal protection guarantee, because 
the substantive guarantees of the Amendment serve as the strongest protection against the 
limitation of these rights.”  Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1213 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda & J. Nelson Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 
(1978)).  On that basis, the Ninth Circuit treated an “equal protection claim as subsumed by, 
and co-extensive with, [the Section 1983 plaintiff’s] First Amendment claim.”  Id.  This Court 
need go no further in rejecting Plaintiffs’ equal protection theory. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should decide Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
without reaching any constitutional question if possible.  If the Court reaches Plaintiffs’ 
challenge to the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), it should reject it.  
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